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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in
Atlanta, Georgia convened an expert workshop to address the role of
race and ethnicity in public health surveillance.' The workshop fo-
* LL.M. (Cand.) University of Houston Health Law Center; J.D., Thurgood Marshall
School of Law, Texas Southern University; M.A., M.P.H, University of Massachusetts, Amherst;
B.A., University of Nairobi, Kenya. I would like to thank the following for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions for this article: Professor Chukwumerije Okezie, Professor Constance
Fain, and Rikiya Thomas, J.D.
1. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Use of Race and Ethnicity in Public Health
Surveillance. Summary of the CDC/ATSDR Workshop, MORBIDrrY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY
REPORT 42 (RR-10) (1993).
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cused on the limitations of the use of race and ethnicity in public
health surveillance and the problems that persisted because of those
limitations.2 A decade and a half later, questions still abound about
classification by race, color, or ethnicity in public health.3 Of particu-
lar interest is the legal debate on whether the use of racial and ethnic
data in public health surveillance4 violates the Equal Protection guar-
antees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.5 Courts have increasingly held that public entities can-
not discriminate on the basis of race,6 yet the use of race in both medi-
cal research and public health surveillance is widely accepted.7
This paper first describes the role of the federal government in pub-
lic health activities and explains how race is used in public health sur-
veillance. The paper then discusses the legal basis for public health
surveillance as well as the legal pitfalls involved in the collection of
racial statistics by public health practitioners. 8 The issue of racial clas-
sification in public health surveillance has been of continuing concern
to many public health agencies. Voter initiatives in states like Califor-
nia, Michigan, and Washington demonstrate that the issue remains of
crucial importance. Moreover, a recent Supreme Court of the United
States (Supreme Court) case indicates that the federal courts are
likely to take a more conservative and stricter look at the use of racial
statistics by governmental agencies, including those charged with pub-
lic health activities.9 Against this background, the paper recommends
the inclusion of public health attorneys and other lawyers in the initial
drafting, formulation, testing, and implementation of data collection
instruments. Attorneys are familiar with the constitutional principles
2. Id.
3. INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARI-
TIES IN HEALTHCARE (Brian D. Smedley, Adrienne Y. Stith & Alan R. Nelson eds., National
Academies Press) (2003), http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record-id=10260&page=R1.
4. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, IMMUNIZATION SURVEILLANCE, ASSESSMENT AND
MONITORING (2008), http://www.who.int/immunization-monitoring/burden/routinesurveillance/
en/index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) (defining "public health surveillance" as the "ongoing,
systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of health-related data essential to the planning,
implementation, and evaluation of public health practice.").
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing in part, "nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.").
6. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 438
U.S. 265 (1978); Brown v. Bd. of. Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Erik Lilquist & Charles Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine,
39 HARV. C. R-C.L. L. REV. 391(2004) (noting that "even more dramatic is the increasing ac-
ceptance among researchers and clinicians of race as an appropriate focus of medical study and
treatment.").
8. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE PUBLIC
HEALTH WORKFORCE: AN AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, http://www.health.gov/phfunc
tions/pubhlth.pdf.
9. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007).
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PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE
of equal protection and due process; standards of review; the powers
and duties of the states; the limitations on the powers of the states to
constrain the autonomy, privacy, liberty, proprietary, or other legally
protected interests of individuals in order to assure the health of a
population; and the limitations on the duties of the states to assure the
health of a population." The paper also suggests that; unlike educa-
tion, public employment, and contracting; health is an important area
where collection of data by race is needed, especially in an effort to
understand and eliminate racial and health disparities.
II. Is RACIAL SURVEILLANCE ACCEPTABLE?
Public health surveillance depends on the collection of racial and
ethnic data. Such data are used by epidemiologists and policy makers
to monitor trends over time at the national, state, and local levels; to
evaluate programs; to understand the etiologic process and identify
points of intervention; and to monitor and enforce laws against dis-
crimination." Unlike education, public employment and public con-
tracting, public health is an area where collection of data by race is
needed. Nowhere is this need more urgent than in the elimination of
health disparities. For example, the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) stated in a report that
although racial and ethnic minority groups have experienced substan-
tial improvements in social and economic well-being during the sec-
ond half of this century, health disparities between groups persist and
in, some cases, have widened. Blacks, Hispanics, Asian, and Native
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islanders (especially new immigrants and
refugees), and American Indians/Alaska Native populations continue
to experience social and economic disadvantages in many arenas. 12
Additionally, "[t]he poverty rate for non-Hispanic whites remains
well below that for U.S. racial and ethnic minorities."13 "Although
many of the disparities in poverty rates can be explained by differ-
ences in factors such as age distribution, family structure, and educa-
tional attainment, substantial differentials persist even among
individuals with similar characteristics."' 4 For example, "[in 1997, 8.6
10. LAWRENCE GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT (Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press 2000).
11. Olivia Carter-Pokras et al., Letter to the Editor, RE: "Four-Year Review of the Use of
Race and Ethnicity in Epidemiologic and Public Health Research," Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 403-04
(2004).
12. HHS DATA COUNCIL WORKING GROUP ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DATA & THE DATA
WORK GROUP OF THE HHS INITIATIVE TO ELIMINATE RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN
HEALTH, IMPROVING THE COLLECTION AND USE OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DATA IN HHS (1999),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/datacncl/racerpt/chap2.htm.
13. Id.
14. Id.
20081
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percent of non-Hispanic whites lived in poverty compared to 26.5 per-
cent of Blacks, 14 percent of Asian, Native Hawaiian, or other Pacific
Islanders, 27.9 percent of Mexican Americans, and 34.2 percent of Pu-
erto Ricans."15 The Institute of Medicine released a report in 2002
which stated that
standardized data collection ... is critically important in the effort to
understand and eliminate racial and ethnic disparities in healthcare.
Having data on patient and provider race and ethnicity would allow
researchers to better disentangle factors that are associated with
healthcare disparities. In addition, collecting appropriate data related
to racial or ethnic differences in the process, structure and outcomes
of care can help identify discriminatory practices, whether they are the
result of intentional behaviors and attitudes, or unintended-but no
less harmful-biases or policies that result in racial or ethnic differ-
ences in care that cannot be justified by patient preferences or clinical
need. 16
Both the DHHS and the Institute of Medicine offer the above justifi-
cations as to why the use of racial statistics is acceptable in public
health research and activities in general. 17
On the other hand, some critics contend that an overemphasis on
race and genetics in health research masks the socioeconomic factors
that cause many of today's diseases. 8 Others contend that the use of
racial statistics in health surveillance sometimes leads to misclassifica-
tions that underestimate the problems the data is supposed to solve. 19
Furthermore, the critics observe, race based programs are disfavored
by the Supreme Court. In Adarand Constructors, Inc v. Pena, Justice
Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, stated that
"to pursue the concept of racial entitlement-even for the most admi-
rable and benign purposes-is to reinforce and preserve for future
mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege
and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here.
It is American."2 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts in Parents Involved
in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 et. al., observed that "at the
heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the sim-
ple command that the government must treat citizens as individuals,
15. Id.
16. INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARI-
TIES IN HEALTHCARE, supra note 3, at 215.
17. See id. See also generally HHS, supra note 12.
18. Jonathan Kahn, Getting the Numbers Right. Statistical Mischief and Racial Profiling in
Heart Failure Research, 46 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MED. 473-83 (2004).
19. See generally Douglas A. Thoroughman et al., Racial Misclassification of American Indi-
ans in Oklahoma State Surveillance Data for Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 155 AM. J. EPIDEMI-
OLOGY 1137-41 (2002).
20. 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995).
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not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national
class."
21
Importing these arguments into public health may not be correct.
What critics of the use of racial statistics may fail to grasp is that pub-
lic health does not focus on an individual but on the population. This
distinction is important in the sense that public health activities are
designed to assure the health of a population and are rarely designed
for any one individual.22 On the other hand, discrimination focuses on
each individual as a member of a particular racial group. Addition-
ally, health disparities correlate with race, and a solution for the for-
mer necessarily entails the use of the latter.23 Furthermore, even
though the Supreme Court disfavors race based programs, it has
neither been presented with, nor had to decide on the constitutionality
of racial surveillance. This leaves the door open for public health
practitioners to use race based statistics in planning, implementing,
and evaluating public health programs.
III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC
HEALTH SURVEILLANCE
The preservation of public health is one of the duties that devolve
on the states as sovereign powers.24 The police powers of the state
extend to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons.2 1 Under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, powers not delegated to the United States are reserved to the
states.26 Although the federal government has no police powers per
se, it exercises health powers in the areas it controls.27 Article 1, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution gives the federal govern-
ment authority over places purchased or ceded.28 Similarly, Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 18 gives Congress powers "to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the forego-
ing powers."2 9 In exercise of these powers, the federal government
provides for the healthcare of particular classes of persons-such as
21. 127 S.Ct. at 2757 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
22. See generally GOSTIN, supra note 10.
23. See generally Michael J. Fine et al., The Role of Race and Genetics in Health Disparities
Research, 95 AM. J. PUBLIC HEALTH 2125-28 (2005), http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/article
render.fcgi?artid=1449495.
24. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health § 1.
25. See Glen H. Reynolds and David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power: Some Observa-
tions for A New Century 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511 (2000).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 17-18.
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
2008]
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Indians, victims of poverty, and children-for whom it has special
responsibilities.30
The federal government protects and promotes national public
health and safety by funding health research under the auspices of
federal agencies, by enabling regulations relating to foreign and inter-
state commerce, and by provisions establishing federal financial aid to
state and local health programs.31 Title 42, the Public Health and
Welfare of the United States Code, provides authority to federal offi-
cials regarding public health and safety.32 Congress, through the
DHHS, created bodies such as the Public Health Service 33 and a num-
ber of research institutes to administer programs with respect to par-
ticular areas of health research,34 for example, the National Center on
Minority Health and Health Disparities.3 The public health functions
of the DHHS extend to quarantine regulations, regulation of biologi-
cal products, control and management of hospitals, and the medical
care and treatment of various categories of persons.36 These functions
involve broad powers to establish and enforce health standards as well
as public health surveillance. In public health surveillance, both the
state and federal governments often have concurrent jurisdiction in
promoting the best use of public health resources.37
IV. STANDARDS FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF
FEDERAL DATA ON RACE
Generally, public health surveillance is "the ongoing, systematic,
collection, analysis, and interpretation of outcome specific data essen-
tial to the planning, implementation and evaluation of public health
practice and closely integrated with the timely dissemination of these
data to public health practitioners responsible for prevention and con-
trol."38 Public health surveillance activities are generally authorized
by legislators and carried out by public health officials.39 The collec-
tion of race and ethnic statistics has been an important component of
30. 39A C.J.S. Health and Environment § 3 (2006).
31. Id.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 1944). See also 42 U.S.C. § 202 (2008).
33. Id.
34. 39A C.J.S. Health and Environment § 3 (2006).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 287c-31.
36. 39 AM. JUR. 2D Health §15 (2007).
37. Id. at n.8.
38. ROBERT HAHN & DONNA STROUP, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEIL-
LANCE: CRITERIA FOR THE SCIENTIFIC USE OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES, CDC-ATDSR WORKSHOP,
PUB. HEALTH REPS. 109: 7-15 (1994), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.
fcgi?artid=1402237&blobtype=pdf.
39. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public
Health Surveillance Systems, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, 50 (RR13), 1-35
(2001).
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public health surveillance efforts used to identify differences in health
status among racial and ethnic minorities.4" This information is col-
lected by local, state, and federal health agencies.4" According to the
CDC's Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance
Systems,42 data from a public health surveillance system can be used
to:
1. guide immediate action for cases of public health importance;
2. measure the burden of a disease (or other health-related event),
including changes in related factors, the identification of popula-
tions at high risk, and the identification of new or emerging health
concerns;
3. monitor trends in the burden of a disease (or other health-related
event), including the detection of epidemics (outbreaks) and
pandemics;
4. guide the planning, implementation, and evaluation of programs
to prevent and control disease, injury, or adverse exposure;
5. evaluate public policy;
6. detect changes in health practices and the effects of these changes;
7. prioritize the allocation of health resources;
8. describe the clinical course of disease; and
9. provide a basis for epidemiologic research.43
Much of the public health surveillance data collected by govern-
ment agencies conforms to the Revised Minimum Standards for the
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, issued by the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1997.44 The standards
were developed in cooperation with Federal agencies to provide con-
sistent data on race and ethnicity throughout the Federal Govern-
ment. Development of the data standards stemmed in large measure
from new responsibilities to enforce civil rights laws. Data were
needed to monitor equal access in housing, education, employment,
and other areas, for populations that historically had experienced dis-
crimination and differential treatment because of their race or
ethnicity.45
40. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 1.
41. Id.
42. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 38.
43. Id.
44. Revisions to the Standards for Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62
Fed. Reg. 58,782-90 (1997). See also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OMB BULL. No. 00-02,
GUIDANCE ON AGGREGATION AND ALLOCATION OF DATA ON RACE FOR USE IN CIVIL RIGHTS
MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT (2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/
b00-02.html.
45. 62 Fed. Reg. at 58,782.
2008]
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The categories4 6 developed by OMB were not anthropologic or scien-
tifically based designations, but instead were categories that described
the socio-cultural construct of our society.47 Whereas these categories
may be relevant in the health arena for studies of diseases such as
diabetes, heart disease, HIV/Aids and other Sexually Transmitted In-
fections,48 they may not necessarily work in the policy arena. The
longstanding controversy over the use of affirmative action for promo-
tion of African, Hispanic, and Asian American civil rights is a case in
point.49
Generally, racial categories used in public health surveillance are:
White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Na-
tive, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Highlander.5" The
OMB Standards included two ethnic categories, namely Hispanic or
Latino and not Hispanic or Latino.51 The DHHS, of which CDC is a
part, adopted these standardized categories for its agencies. To help
assess various health related data, including public health surveillance
and research, agencies report statistics using these standardized cate-
gories.52 Most state health departments use these same standards
since they are required to report the same information to the CDC
using these categories.53
V. LEGAL BASIS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE
IN GENERAL
Legal considerations for Public Health Surveillance generally
include:
(1) protection available under state or federal law during and after the
investigation for the records collected and generated in relation to the
investigation; (2) confidentiality provisions for medical and other in-
formation; (3) required reporting of particular diseases or conditions;
(4) status of information in investigative files on the Federal Freedom
46. Id. (stating the revised standards had five minimum categories for data on race: Ameri-
can Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Black or African American, Native Hawaiian or Other
Pacific Islander, and White).
47. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY COLLECTION OF RACE AND
ETHNICITY DATA IN CLINICAL TRIALS (2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/Cder/guidance/
5656fnl.htm#.
48. See Claudia Dreifus, A Conversation with Herman Taylor: Mississippi's 'Heart Man' Ex-
amines Links Between Race and Disease, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2006.
49. See generally THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE (George E. Curry, ed., Harper Col-
lins) (1998) (discussing affirmative action issues in detail).
50. 62 Fed. Reg. at 58,782.
51. Catherine Sorenson, Betty Wood & Edward Prince, Race and Ethnicity Data: Develop-
ing A Common Language for Public Health Surveillance, CAL. J. HEALTH PROMOTION (1) Ha-
waii 91-104 (2003).
52. U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., supra note 46.
53. See generally Standards for Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 60
Fed. Reg. 44,674, 44,678 (1995).
[Vol. 31:1
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of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552 or state FOIA counterparts
and; (5) the possible applicability of federal or state human subjects
research regulations ....
The major source of legal authority for public health interventions
is "police power," defined as the inherent authority of all sovereign
governments to enact laws and promote laws that safeguard the
health, welfare, and morals of its citizens. Case law tends to side
with the broad police powers of the state and give deference to health
officers in providing legal justification for public health activities, in-
cluding surveillance. Some examples are Jacobson v. Massachusetts,56
Nebbia v. New York,57 and Simon v. Sargent.5"
In Jacobson, the Supreme Court "recognized the right of a state to
pass sanitary laws, laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or
property within its limits, laws to prevent persons and animals suffer-
ing under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, from coming
within its borders."59 Jacobson challenged a Massachusetts law that
required everyone to be vaccinated against smallpox.6" Jacobson, who
refused to submit to a small pox vaccination pursuant to the statute,
argued that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional.6' Writing for
the Court, Justice Harlan noted that "the police power of a state must
be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established
directly by legislative enactments, as will protect the public health and
the public safety."62
Similarly, in Nebbia, the Supreme Court held that a defendant was
not deprived of his equal protection rights because of the government
regulation of milk prices by the New York Milk Control Board. 3
There, the New York Legislature passed a Milk Control Law that es-
tablished a Milk Control Board with the power to fix minimum and
maximum milk retail prices charged by stores to consumers. 64 Nebbia
was convicted for selling two quarts of milk below the minimum price
54. Verla S. Neslund, Richard A. Goodman & David W. Fleming, Frontline Public Health:
Surveillance and Outbreak Investigations, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 143-59, 153
(Richard A. Goodman et al. eds. 2003).
55. James J. Misrahi, Gene W. Matthews & Richard E. Hoffman, Legal Authorities for In-
terventions During Public Health Emergencies, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 195-210
(Richard A. Goodman et al. eds. 2003) (citing LAWRENCE GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:
POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT (Univ. of California Press 2000)).
56. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
57. Nebbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
58. Simon v. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. 277 (D. Mass. 1972), affd, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972).
59. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28.
60. Id. at 13-14.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 518.
64. Id. at 515.
2008]
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set by a Milk Control Board.65 Nebbia contended that the order vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.66 Writing for the majority, Justice Roberts
asserted that
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the ab-
sence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote
public welfare and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such pol-
icy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws
passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the require-
ments of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio.6 7
In Simon v. Sargent, plaintiff challenged a Massachusetts law that
required motorcycle riders to wear helmets on the grounds that the
provision was violative of his due process rights.68 The court found
that the section requiring motorcyclists to wear protective headgear,
which conformed to certain minimum standards, bore a real and sub-
stantial relation to public health and general welfare and was a valid
exercise of police power.69 The court observed that, when a motorcy-
clist who is not wearing a helmet gets injured, society bears the cost;
The public has an interest in minimizing the resources directly in-
volved. From the moment of injury, society picks the person up off
the highway; delivers him to a municipal hospital and municipal doc-
tors; provides him with unemployment compensation if, after recov-
ery, he cannot replace his lost job; and, if the injury causes permanent
disability, may assume responsibility for his and his family's subsis-
tence. We do not understand a state of mind that permits plaintiff to
think that only he himself is concerned.7 °
When it comes to race and health, the controlling federal statute is
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act).7 ' The Act prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by any
65. JEROME A. BARON, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, CASES
AND MATERIALS 423 (6th ed. 2005).
66. Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 515. See also U.S. CONST. amend XIV (providing in part, "nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
67. Nebbia 291 U.S. at 516.
68. Sargent, 346 F. Supp. at 279.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (2008) (stating, "No person in the United States, shall, on the
ground of race, color or national origin, be excluded from participation, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.").
[Vol. 31:1
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program or agency receiving federal funds.72 The Act casts a wide net
by covering such areas as housing, education, employment, and medi-
cal care.73 More specifically, the regulations promulgated by the
DHHS under Title VI of the Act address the impact of practices or
policies that make no reference to members of racial or ethnic groups
but have discriminatory impact on them." Discriminatory impact fo-
cuses on results rather than intent.75 Another important area of law is
Title VII of the Act,76 which prohibits discrimination by covered em-
ployers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.77
A number of cases challenged the disproportionate impact of poli-
cies on those affected by Title VII.78 For example, in NAACP v. Med.
Ctr. the court held that "a disproportionate impact or effect is simply
an additional method of demonstrating impermissible discrimination
under Title VII. ' ' 79 A "prima facie case could be established under
the impact theory if the plaintiff demonstrates that a facially neutral
policy disproportionately affected persons protected by Title VII" 8
The complaining party must "show that other ... selection devices,
without a similarly undesirable . . .effect, would also serve the ...
legitimate interest."81 In that case, the medical center, which was lo-
cated in the city, planned to relocate its main facility to a suburb while
keeping its city location operating with fewer beds.82 Appellants-
various minority, handicapped, and elderly organizations-challenged
the medical center's reorganization plan and claimed violations under
Title VI of the Act among others.83 The trial court found that appel-
lants failed to prove discrimination under federal law.84 The circuit
court affirmed the reasoning that appellants failed to show any inten-
tional discrimination or discriminatory impact and therefore failed to
satisfy their burden of proving the case. 5
72. Id.
73. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-80.3 (2008).
74. Panel on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Medical Care, Physicians for Human Rights,
The Right to Equal Treatment: An Action Plan to End Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Clinical
Diagnosis and Treatment In the United States 17 (2003).
75. Id. at 19.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(3).
77. Id. at 25.
78. See generally Daniel K Hampton, Title VI Challenges by Private Parties to the Location
of Health Care Facilities: Toward a Just and Effective Action , 37 B. C. L. REV. 517 (1996) and
Richard J. Zall, Note, Maintaining Health Care in the Inner City: Title VI and Hospital Reloca-
tions, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 271 (1980).
79. NAACP v. Med. Ctr., 657. F.2d 1322, 1334 (3rd Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 1333. (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
81. Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
82. Id. at 1324.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1326.
85. Id. at 1337.
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Similarly, in Bryan v. Koch, the court held that Title VI of the Act
does not prohibit conduct which has a disproportionate racial impact
or effect without conduct motivated by a racially discriminatory pur-
pose.8 6 There, plaintiffs brought suit against the mayor of New York
City to preclude closing a city hospital which served a population that
consisted of 98% minority group members.87 The court reasoned that
the evidence presented by the City sustained a determination that it
made an appropriate choice to close a hospital in response to financial
difficulties and that it was not required by Title VI to consider alterna-
tives to avoid a disparate racial impact other than to assess all of the
municipal hospitals in order to select one or more for closing.88
Although the above cited cases were not decided on public health
grounds, they dealt with health facilities that offered health care to
minority groups who felt that relocation would have a disproportion-
ate racial impact. Having access to care is a major determinant of
health; therefore, any barriers would have significant impact on public
health.89
In general, courts accept the government's assertions of the need to
protect public welfare. However, the government may discriminate
against groups of people, but it must have a compelling reason to do
so.9° For Title VI and VII challenges however, "discrimination attrib-
utable to socio-economic status alone" is not enough.91 For health
discrimination, "there must be evidence that the disparate impact, for
example health outcome, is causally related to the defendant's facially
neutral policy." 92
Unlike medical care which focuses mostly on Title VI and VII
causes of actions, the use of race in public health surveillance is most
likely to be challenged on Equal Protection grounds. This is the con-
cept that similarly situated persons should be treated similarly by the
government.93 However, as discussed in part two, the policy and legal
issues posed by racial surveillance in the public health arena demon-
strate that racial surveillance may not necessarily amount to racial dis-
crimination given that there may be legitimate public policy reasons
for using racial classification in gathering public health information.
86. Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612, 619-20 (2nd Cir. 1980).
87. Id. at 617.
88. Id. at 620-21.
89. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERV., NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES 9 (2003), http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhdr
03/nhdr2003.pdf.
90. See, e.g., NAACP, 657 F.2d 1322 (1981) (holding that, although certain groups were
negatively impacted, the relocation of a hospital was in the best interest of the communities).
91. Panel on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Medical Care, supra note 73, at 19.
92. Id.
93. Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10 (C.C. Cal. 1900).
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Indeed the Supreme Court has allowed the use of racial classifications
only if it is needed or promotes a narrow goal.9 4 The Supreme Court
has held that "'all racial classifications must be analyzed by a review-
ing court under strict scrutiny standard . . . 9'
VI. RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND STRICT SCRUTINY
The Supreme Court uses various standards of review depending
upon the alleged harm inflicted by the racial classification and the
characteristics of that classification.96 The three common standards
used in equal protection cases are rational basis, intermediate scru-
tiny, and strict scrutiny.97  Generally, the choice of one standard of
review over another hinges on:
(1) the importance of the alleged or, in the case of the rational basis
test, conceivable government interest realized by the classification
("compelling," "substantial," or "legitimate"); and (2) whether and
how the classification at issue is likely to realize that interest (that is,
strict scrutiny requires the statute be narrowly tailored and essential to
achieving a compelling government interest). 98
Legal controversies that challenge the states' powers to regulate
health, welfare, and morals of their citizens are reviewed under the
rational basis standard.99 For example, in state quarantine laws, the
legislatures, under the police powers of the states, have the authority
to establish quarantine regulations for the protection of the public's
health and welfare.100 To warrant detention of a person in quarantine,
it only is necessary that there be probable cause to believe that the
person has an infectious disease which is communicable.' 0 '
However, the use of the rational basis test for suits involving infec-
tious diseases can sometimes be disadvantageous to the patients.
1 0 2
94. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 202 (1995) (holding that "[w]hen
race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is within constitu-
tional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test ....").
95. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 et. al., 127 S.Ct 2738, 2762
(2007) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc, v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
96. Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of "Public
Morality" Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purpose of Equal Protection Re-
view?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 145 (1998).
97. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITIUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 671-72 (3rd
ed. 2006).
98. Cicchino, supra note 95, at 144-45.
99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 96, at 677.
100. See Ex Parte James, 181 S.W.2d. 83, 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944) (holding that state gov-
ernment has the right to "quarantine against contagious and communicable diseases.").
101. Ex Parte Martin, 188 P.2d 287, 290-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948). See also Ex Parte James at
84 (holding that the Government has a right, under its police power, to quarantine against conta-
gious and venereal communicable diseases).
102. See, e.g., Jasa v. Douglass County, 510 N.W.2d 281 (Neb. 1994) (holding that choosing
not to collect epidemiological information was within agency discretion. There, a minor, by and
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For example, in New York State Soc. of Surgeons v. Axelrod,10 3 the
court held that the refusal of the Commissioner of Health and the
New York State Public Health Council to add human immu-
nodeficiency virus (HIV) to the lists of communicable and sexually
transmissible diseases was reasonable and rational.10 4 In that case, pe-
titioners, four medical organizations, sent a letter to the Commis-
sioner of Health requesting that infection with HIV to be added to the
lists of communicable and sexually transmissible diseases pursuant to
Public Health Law § 225(5)(h). °5 The Commissioner denied the re-
quest on the ground that designation would be contrary to the health
of the public because it would discourage cooperation of affected indi-
viduals and would lead to the loss of confidentiality for those infected
with the disease. °6 The court agreed with the Commissioner reason-
ing that, under the terms of the statute, the Commissioner had discre-
tion to determine the diseases to be designated as reportable. 10 7 The
court observed that:
there are valid reasons for giving the Commissioner discretion in these
matters. Placement of any disease on the communicable or sexually
transmitted disease lists triggers statutory provisions relating to isola-
tion and quarantine, reporting, mandatory testing and contact trac-
ing. . .provisions which, for public health reasons, may not be
appropriate in dealing with every type of communicable or sexually
transmissible disease.'
8
Because the court used the rational basis test, the Commissioner's
actions were not found unreasonable or capricious. The rate of HIV/
AIDS in the U.S. is significantly higher among minorities than
whites.'09 In New York, for example, as of December 2005, there
were 45.2% cases of blacks living with HIV and AIDS compared to
through his parents filed suit under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-901 et seq. (2007) against Douglas
County, alleging that its department of health failed to take appropriate steps with respect to the
presence of bacterial meningitis in a day-care facility, causing the minor to suffer permanent
disability. The court concluded that, where a health officer must make a judgmental decision
within a regulatory framework, the decision is not a ministerial act but a discretionary function.).
103. New York State Soc. of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 572 N.E.2d 605 (N.Y. 1991).
104. Id. See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding a New York state public
health reporting law on the grounds that the statute was a product of an orderly and rational
legislative decision).
105. Id. See N.Y. State Public Health Law § 225(5)(h) (McKinney 2008) (providing in perti-
nent part that the Sanitary Code may designate the communicable diseases which are dangerous
to the public health).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 684.
108. Id.
109. Isabel M. Estrada Portales, Aids Among Minorities, OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH,
Dec. 11, 2006, http://www.omhrc.gov/templates/content.aspx?ID=4338.
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22.5% of whites."' 0 Not including HIV/AIDS in the reportable dis-
ease list may have a discriminatory impact. One could, therefore, ar-
gue that the use of the rational basis standard, in reviewing
discriminatory impact in public health surveillance, may sometimes be
ineffective. This is more so with diseases whose prevalence rates are
higher in some racial groups than others."
On the other hand, discrimination based on race or national origin
is subject to strict scrutiny standard."' Under strict scrutiny, a law is
upheld if it is proved necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose.113 This principle was reinforced in Grutter v. Bollinger114
where the Supreme Court held that a narrowly tailored use by public
schools of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest
in educational benefits of a diverse student body did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 5 Here, the
Court approved racial classification where its benefits were limited to
diversity in education.1 1 6
Applying the same principle to public health, courts would not have
a problem with racial classification if there were a close fit between
racial classification and a compelling state interest. In Regents of Uni-
versity of California v. Bakke, the Court held that "racial and ethnic
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the
most exacting judicial examination." 1 7 In the same opinion, Justice
Powell explained that, in some situations, the state's interest in facili-
tating the healthcare of its citizens could be sufficiently compelling to
support the use of suspect classification. Chief Justice Roberts reiter-
ated this point in the majority opinion of Parents Involved in Commu-
nity Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 et al."8 In that case, the
majority stated that, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in
the school context, two interests that qualify as compelling are the
interest of remedying the effects of past discrimination and the inter-
est in diversity in higher education." 9
110. New York State Department of Health, Bureau of HIV/AIDS Epidemiology, New York
State HIV/AIDS Surveillance Annual Report (2007), http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/aids/
statistics/annual/2005/2005-12_annualsurveillancejreport.pdf.
111. Id.
112. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 645 (2d ed.
1999).
113. Id.
114. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
115. Id. at 329-31.
116. Erik Lilquist and Charles Sullivan, Comment, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling
in Medicine, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 443 (2004).
117. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).
118. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 et. al., 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2752
(2007).
119. Id.
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These interests may not necessarily apply to public health activities,
yet because racial classification is involved, strict scrutiny still applies.
Public health practitioners, therefore, have to create their own com-
pelling interests in order to justify the use of racial classification.12 °
One interest that has been cited as compelling in the field of public
health is addressing the problem of health disparities. In 2000, Con-
gress enacted the Minority Health and Health Disparities Research
and Education Act12 1 which directed the National Academies of Sci-
ence to:
conduct a comprehensive study of the Department of Health and
Human Services' data collection systems and practices, and any data
collection or reporting systems required under any of the programs or
activities of the Department, relating to the collection of data on race
or ethnicity, including other Federal data collection systems (such as
the Social Security Administration) with which the Department inter-
acts to collect relevant data on race and ethnicity and prepare and
submit a report that (1) identifies the data needed to support efforts to
evaluate the effects of socioeconomic status, race and ethnicity on ac-
cess to health care and other services and on disparity in health and
other social outcomes and the data needed to enforce existing protec-
tions for equal access to health care; and (2) examines the effective-
ness of the systems and practices of the Department of Health and
Human Services described in subsection (a), including pilot and dem-
onstration projects of the Department, and the effectiveness of se-
lected systems and practices of other Federal, State, and tribal
agencies and the private sector, in collecting and analyzing such data,
(3) contains recommendations for ensuring that the Department of
Health and Human Services, in administering its entire array of pro-
grams and activities, collects, or causes to be collected, reliable and
complete information relating to race and ethnicity; and (4) includes
projections about the costs associated with the implementation of the
recommendations described in paragraph (3), and the possible effects
of the costs on program operations.1 22
By ratifying this Act, Congress seemed to provide a reason that is
sufficiently compelling to support the use of suspect classification in
the collection of data relating to race and ethnicity as determinants of
health disparities. But health disparities, without more, may be too
amorphous to support the use of racial statistics in public health activi-
ties. To withstand exact judicial scrutiny, the use of race in public
health activities, including surveillance, should be narrowly tailored to
further a compelling interest in seeking to remedy-for example, past
120. Minority Health and Health Disparities Research and Education Act, Pub.L.No. 106-
525, § 301, 114 Stat. 2495, 2507-2509 (2000).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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societal discrimination in health services-and not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection guarantee. In the Equal Pro-
tection area, the use of racial statistics is likely to run afoul of the law.
VII. LEGAL PITFALLS OF USING RACE IN PUBLIC
HEALTH ACTIVITIES
Public health activities that have a disparate impact on one racial
group may also run afoul of the law. Enforcement of an ordinance
may adversely affect one racial group more than another. In Jew Ho
v. Williamson,'23 the Court invalidated a San Francisco city ordinance
that quarantined a twelve block area of Chinatown purportedly to
control bubonic plague.124 The Court held that a municipal regulation
establishing a quarantine district is void and violates the constitutional
guaranty of Equal Protection of the laws where it is shown that it is
enforced against all Chinese persons within the district and against the
buildings occupied by them, while it is not enforced against persons of
other races, or against their residences, although situated within the
limits of the district as defined in the regulation.125 The resolution was
passed after two public health officials reported cases of bubonic
plague which occurred within a section of the city populated with Chi-
nese immigrants.126 Nine cases were reported, and as a result, the
health officials were given the authority to establish quarantine within
the district of the city where the plague had been discovered. 2 7 Jew
Ho, who owned a grocery store, argued that his business was nega-
tively impacted by the quarantine measures since customers were no
longer able to carry on business with those outside of the quarantined
district. 128 Additionally, he argued that the ordinance was anti-Chi-
nese in that it was "enforced against persons of the Chinese race and
nationality only, and not against persons of other races. ' 12 9 The Court
agreed, reasoning that since the board had left out members of races
other than the Chinese in its quarantine order, this was tantamount to
the administration of a law "with an evil eye and an unequal hand."13
Similarly, Justice Harlan noted that the courts may strike down leg-
islation designed to protect the general welfare when it has no real or
substantial relation to the public health, morals, or safety, or if the
legislation is a plain palpable invasion of rights secured by the consti-
123. Jew Ho, 103 F. at 10.
124. Id. at 26.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 12.
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id. at 12-13.
130. Id. at 24.
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tution in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.'3' In his view, "the police power
of a state, whether exercised directly by the legislature, or by a local
body acting under its authority, may be exerted in such circumstances,
or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases, as to
justify interference by the courts to prevent wrong and oppression. '"132
Thus, using racial statistics that are unreasonable or oppressive to one
group is unconstitutional.
Additionally, there are statutory limitations to the use of racial clas-
sifications in health interventions. Title VI of the Act prohibits race
discrimination in federally funded programs regardless of whether the
recipient is a public or private institution.133 Sources of public health
surveillance information regarding the health status of the population
and racial groups include state agencies and multiple federal agencies,
such as CDC, Indian Health Service, and the National Cancer Insti-
tute.134 Thus, most public health surveillance initiatives are impacted
by Title VI of the Act. However, Title VI creates no legal liability for
healthcare providers who collect and report healthcare quality data by
race and ethnicity, when such an effort is undertaken as part of an
overall program of quality improvement.135 In medicine, for example,
treating individuals differently on account of race might be permissi-
ble so long as the evidence of racial differences are sufficiently strong
and the differences in treatment are properly tailored to that
evidence. 36
At the state level, there are laws that allow or prohibit the collec-
tion of race and ethnicity data in public health and healthcare. In
2003, the Institute of Medicine's report noted that while the vast ma-
jority of states do not prohibit collection of patients' race and ethnicity
data, some may impose restraints on when and how such data may be
collected.137 For example, California, Maryland, New Hampshire, and
New Jersey, by statute or regulation, prohibit the collection of racial
and ethnic data in certain contexts. 38 California's insurance code
prohibits health insurers from identifying or requesting the applicant's
race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin on an insurance appli-
131. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
132. Id. at 38.
133. Lilquist and Sullivan, supra note 7, at 445.
134. CDC, supra note 1.
135. SARAH ROSENBAUM ET AL., POLICY BRIEF, THE LEGALITY OF COLLECrING AND Dis-
CLOSING PATIENT RACE AND ETHNICITY DATA (2006), http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/
other/RaceEthnicDisparitiesData06222006.pdf.
136. Lilquist and Sullivan, supra, note 7, at 445.
137. Institute of Medicine, supra, note 3, at 217.
138. NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM AND OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, ASSESSMENT
OF STATE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES AFFECTING THE COLLECTION AND REPORTING
OF RACIAL ETHNIC DATA BY HEALTH INSURERS AND MANAGED CARE PLANS (2001).
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cation."' The New Jersey managed care contract provides for racial
and ethnic data collection only in the case of an enrollee's consent to
sterilization. 140  Furthermore, past voter initiatives in California,141
Michigan, 42 and Washington 143 permitted amendments to their state
constitutions to ban the use of preferential treatment to persons or
groups based on race, gender, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
public education, employment, and contracting. The Michigan Civil
Rights Initiative, for example, amended the Michigan Constitution to
prohibit the:
University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State Uni-
versity, and any other public college or university, community college,
or school district [in Michigan from discriminating] against, or
grant[ing] preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the
basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation
of public employment, public education, or public contracting. 144
The relevance of these state voter initiatives to public health is that
certain public health agencies, particularly those offering services to
the underprivileged or victims of poverty, may be barred from giving
preferential treatment in services to groups based on ethnicity, even if
those groups may be in dire need of those services. Furthermore, cul-
tural competency studies demonstrate that patients tend to relate bet-
ter to healthcare workers who speak their language. 45 In this sense,
some public hospitals, for example, may be prohibited from hiring
persons from certain ethnic groups over others, even if doing so would
improve the health outcome of the population served.
At the local level, the New York City Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene, in January 2006, passed a law that required that most
139. Cal. Ins. Code § 10141 (2008) (stating, "No application for insurance or insurance inves-
tigation report furnished by ... [an insurer] to its agents or employees for use in determining the
insurability of the applicant shall carry any identification, or any requirement therefore, of the
applicant's race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin.").
140. NEW JERSEY NATI'L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM AND OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, As.
SESSMENT OF STATE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES AFFECTING THE COLLECTION AND
REPORTING OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC DATA BY HEALTH INSURERS AND MANAGED CAREPLANS
(2001), http://www.spannj.org/Family2Family/NJhealthdiscriminationlaws.pdf.
141. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (stating that the "state shall not discriminate against, or
grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity,
or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education or public
contracting.").
142. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
143. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1) (2006) (similarly stating that the "state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public edu-
cation or public contracting.").
144. MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
145. OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH, U.S DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, TEACH-
ING CULTURAL COMPETENCE IN HEALTH CARE: A REVIEW OF CURRENT CONCEPTS, POLICIES
AND PRACTICES (2002), http://www.omhrc.gov/assets/pdf/checked/em01garcial.pdf.
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laboratories report the results of a blood test called "AiC" to the De-
partment.'46 "AiC" is a blood test that measures average sugar level
in the blood over three months for people with diabetes.'47 Although
the collection of data on diabetes may not necessarily require the in-
clusion of the race of the patient, the plan to make diabetes a reported
disease, similar to HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis, may touch on privacy
issues unless the department can show that there is a compelling inter-
est in the health of the individual that overrides his privacy.'48 Addi-
tionally, racial differences in disease prevalence do exist, and
collection of disease specific racial data may impact different ethnic
groups differently. For example, between 2001 and 2003, the mul-
tivariate-adjusted incidence of diabetes was lowest among non-His-
panic whites (6.3 per 1000) and highest among non-Hispanic blacks
(8.2 per 1000). 14 9 Other data indicate a Hispanic incidence of diabetes
that is three to five times higher than non-Hispanic whites. 150 This
could have implications on the employment status of those diagnosed
with diabetes. In Darnell v. Thermafiber,15' Darnell, an insulin-de-
pendent Type I diabetic, sued Thermafiber, a manufacturer of mineral
wool insulation, alleging disability discrimination in violation of
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when it rescinded an offer of
employment based on the results of his urine glucose test and inter-
view. 15 The district court granted Thermafiber's motion for summary
judgment. 153 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that Thermafiber reasonably relied on the opin-
ion of the physician conducting the physical examination.'54 Although
Darnell alleged the physician failed to perform an adequate, individu-
alized assessment of his ability to perform the job, the Seventh Circuit
found that the evidence supported the district court's conclusion that
Darnell's uncontrolled diabetes made him a direct threat to workplace
safety.155 One would not be too far off the mark to imagine a scenario
146. New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, The New York City AIC
Registry, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/diabetes/diabetes-nycar.shtml (last visited Jan, 3,
2008).
147. Id.
148. Neil Osterweil, New York City Plans Diabetes Patient Tracking, MEoPAGE TODAY, July
26, 2005, http://www.medpagetoday.com/Endocrinology/Diabetes/tbl/1422 (citing James Pyles,
an attorney and medical privacy advocate, regarding the New York City Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene's AIC registry.).
149. Linda Geis et al., Changes in Incidence of Diabetes in U.S. Adults, 1997-2003, 30 AM. J.
PREV. MED. 371, 373 (2006).
150. HENRY G. CISNEROS, COOPERATIVE ACTION FOR MINORITY HEALTH POLICY: HEALTH
POLICY AND THE HISPANIC 12, 14 (Antonio Furino ed., 1992).
151. Darnell v. Thermafiber, 417 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2005).
152. Id. at 659.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 660.
155. Id. at 662.
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where some employers may use race based public health statistics to
pin point certain racial groups susceptible to particular diseases. Al-
though Title VII of the Act' 56 prohibits employment discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, circumventing
the Act is always a glaring possibility. For example, in 1981, the Air
Force Academy dropped its eight-year ban on applicants who pos-
sessed a single gene for sickle-cell anemia (also referred to as the
"sickle trait").157 At that time, the trait was estimated to be present
among two million American blacks.158 The trait was used to exclude
blacks from the Air Force Academy and was also cited by the Navy, in
keeping blacks out of submarine service. 59 The Air Force Academy
admitted that the decision to drop the ban was made after more medi-
cal knowledge, which indicated that the policy was not justified by
scientific facts, became available. 6 °
In summary, legal pitfalls to the use of racial statistics exist at the
federal, state, and local levels. At the federal level, the use of racial
statistics may implicate Titles VI and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
At the state level, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause may be at issue. And, at the local level, laws designed to col-
lect racial data may implicate issues of personal privacy as well as em-
ployment. How the use of racial data in public health surveillance
impacts public policy is more important to this discussion.
VIII. PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
Public health is a social enterprise that is extremely sensitive to pub-
lic policy. By definition, public health is "what we, as a society, do
collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy. ' 16 Law
is the traditional way in which governments seek to protect the public
good by changing the behavior of individuals.' 62 As a matter of public
policy, governments have the authority to coerce people to do what is
safe for others and for themselves. 163 For example, in Michigan Dept.
of State Police v. Sitz, the Court held that the use of sobriety check-
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
157. Richard Severo, Air Force Academy to Drop its Ban on Applicants with Sickle-Cell
Gene, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1981, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=health&res=9
B06E5DE133BF937A35751COA967948260.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE
OF PUBLIC HEALTH (National Academy Press 1988).
162. Frederic E. Shaw & Christopher P. Ogolla, Law, Behavior, and Injury Prevention, in
INJURY AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION: BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE THEORIES, METHODS, AND APPLI-
CATIONS, 442, 452 (Andrea Carlson Gielen et al. eds., 2006).
163. Id.
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points did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.164 The Court's rationale was that such stops were a reasonable
means of preventing drunken driving.'65
Health policy is driven by health data that indicate the risks or im-
pacts of certain public health activities.166 Health data is collected by
way of public health surveillance. 167 When these statistics are col-
lected by racial categories, a fundamental right may be affected. For
example, researchers with the Health Research and Educational Trust
conducted a survey among one thousand hospitals nationwide to ad-
dress questions about their data collection.168 Thirty percent reported
drawbacks to collecting race and ethnicity data. 169 These drawbacks
included the possibility that collecting data on race and ethnicity
might be used to profile patients and discriminate in the provision of
care. 170 This indicates that the collection of racial statistics has major
implications for public health policy.
As mentioned earlier in this discussion, data on race and ethnicity
are used by epidemiologists and policy makers to monitor trends over
time at the national, state, and local levels; to evaluate programs; to
understand the etiologic process and identify points of intervention;
and to monitor and enforce laws against discrimination. 171 Therefore,
it is critical that public health practitioners understand the impact of
surveillance on policy. Nowhere is this understanding more critical
than among the public health workforce charged with the collection of
this data.
Most public health surveillance is done by epidemiologists, who
study the frequency and distribution of human diseases. 72 One
school of thought holds that many epidemiologists lack policy exper-
tise.173 Proponents of this school of thought contend that science is an
164. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
165. Id. at 455-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment) (stating, "I fully agree with the
Court's lamentations about the slaughter on our highways, and about the dangers posed to al-
most everyone by the driver who is under the influence of alcohol or other drug.").
166. See GUIDELINES WORKING GROUP, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, UPDATED GUIDE-
LINES FOR EVALUATING PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE SYSTEMS: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM
THE GUIDELINES WORKING GROUP (2001), http:/lwww.cdc.gov/mmwrlpreview/mmwrhtml/rr
5013al.htm.
167. See id.
168. Romana Hasnain-Wynia, et al., Who, When, and How: The Current State of Race,
Ethnicity and Primary Language Data Collection in Hospitals (The Commonwealth Fund 2004),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/publications-show.htm?doc-id=225959.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Carter-Pokras et al., supra note 11, at 403.
172. See Charles Poole & Kenneth J, Rothman, Letter to the Editor, Epidemiologic Science
and Public Health Policy, 43 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 1270 (1990); David A. Savitz et al.,
Reassessing the Role of Epidemiology in Public Health, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1158-61 (1999).
173. See Savitz, supra note 171, at 1159.
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attempt to achieve a deeper level of understanding, not an attempt to
establish public policies.174 The job of scientists should be to formu-
late and evaluate scientific hypotheses, rather than to muster support
for or marshal evidence against specific policies. 75 Interestingly, this
was the same argument used in the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis
study. 6
The second school of thought contends that the claim that epidemi-
ologists lack policy expertise is generally weak since epidemiologists
practice in many forms of legal and policy-making areas.'77 The
American College of Epidemiology guidelines state, "epidemiology
has as its primary roles the design and conduct of scientific research
and the public health application of scientific knowledge." '178 Further-
more, many public health professionals (including epidemiologists)
are accustomed to a rational course of preventive public health action,
from medical reports, epidemiologic findings, analysis, and finally
well-considered policy.1 79
Regarding racial surveillance, there have been important changes in
science and policy that impact the use of race and ethnicity in epide-
miologic and public health research.1 s0 For example, Medicaid man-
aged care and State Children's Health Insurance are programs whose
regulations both require the collection and reporting of race or ethnic-
ity data."81 Policy experience for epidemiologists could prove to be
critical.
Epidemiologists are not lawyers; therefore, they are likely to be
walking on a slippery slope when they collect racial data for public
health surveillance. However, epidemiology can and indeed has been
involved in solving and deciding many cases where the disposition
hinged on scientific evidence.1 82
174. Kenneth J. Rothman & Charles Poole, Editorial, Science and Policy Making, 75 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 340, 341 (1985), available at http://www.ajph.org/cgi/reprint/75/4/340.
175. Id. at 341.
176. For a detailed analysis of Tuskegee Syphilis study, see Stephen B. Thomas & Sandra
Crouse Quinn, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY, 1932 TO 1972: IMPLICATIONS FOR HIV EDUCA-
TION AND AIDS RISK EDUCATION PROGRAMS IN THE BLACK COMMUNITY, 81 Am. J. Pub.
Health 1498 (1991), available at http://www.ajph.org/cgi/reprint/81/11/1498.
177. Douglas L. Weed & Pamela J. Mink, Roles and Responsibilities of Epidemiologists, 12
ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 67, 67-72 (2002).
178. ETHICS GUIDELINES § 2.1 (Am. Coll. of Epidemiology 2000).
179. Shaw & Ogolla, supra note 161, at 459.
180. Carter-Pokras et al., supra note 11, at 403.
181. Id. at 403.
182. See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2005); Ealy v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989).
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IX. EPIDEMIOLOGY AND LITIGATION
The role of epidemiology in litigation can not be understated. Epi-
demiological evidence is often used by courts to decide cases where
the plaintiff seeks to establish a causal connection between the expo-
sure and the outcome.'83 Some commentators have observed that
"the main force driving the increased use of epidemiology in the
courtroom has been tort litigation." '184 Tort law "has been used to
seek compensation for injuries in which causation is not provable by
mere eyewitness testimony regarding a specific causal event." '185 For
example, in Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,'86 plaintiff claimed sys-
temic and local injuries from a silicone breast implant and sought re-
view of a summary judgment from the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado granted in favor of defendant, the successor
of the breast implant manufacturer. 187 The appellate court affirmed
the district court's finding that plaintiff's experts did not offer valid
testimony to support either general or specific causation.1 88 Plaintiff's
experts "completely ignored or discounted without explanation the
many epidemiological studies which found no medically reliable link
between silicone breast implants and systemic disease.' 89 The court
reasoned that epidemiology is the best evidence of general causation
in a toxic tort case.' 90 According to the court, "while the presence of
epidemiology does not necessarily end the inquiry, where epidemiol-
ogy is available, it cannot be ignored. As the best evidence of general
causation, it must be addressed."' 9 '
On the other hand, in Sulesky v. United States, 92 the court found
that defendant's flu shot was the proximate cause of plaintiff con-
tracting a disease and that plaintiff was entitled to recover damages
for physical injuries, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and
reasonable and necessary medical expenses, even though epidemio-
logical evidence showed that there was no causal link between the flu
vaccination and the disease contracted by the plaintiff. In that case,
plaintiff, Kathryn Sulesky contracted Gullain-Barre Syndrome after
183. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
184. Tom Christoffel & Stephen P. Teret, Epidemiology and the Law: Courts and Confidence
Intervals, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1557, 1661 (1991)
185. Id. at 1662 (commenting on a "rapidly growing area of tort law usually labeled 'toxic
torts' or 'environmental injury litigation"').
186. Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878.
187. Id. at 880.
188. Id. at 886-87.
189. Id. at 884.
190. Id. at 882.
191. Id.
192. Sulesky v. United States. 545 F. Supp. 426 (W.Va. 1982).
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she received a swine flu shot in 1976.193 The shot was received during
the course of the mass immunization program instituted and con-
ducted by the government.' 94 The judge relied on the testimony of
the treating physicians and wrote that the epidemiological evidence
offered by the government was not determinative on the issue of
causation. 19
5
The relevance of these two cases is not only to show the role of
epidemiology in litigation but also to underscore the larger point that
law, unlike public health, has different standards and levels of proof.
These standards of proof might be higher and/or stricter in racial sur-
veillance than in other forms of surveillance. Additionally, public
health surveillance often involves the collection of epidemiological
data, which is widely accepted into evidence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702.196 Examples of other federal cases in which epidemio-
logical evidence was heavily relied upon include Brock v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.,197 Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,98 and
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc.'9 9 In Brock, plaintiffs
brought suit claiming injury from ingesting a drug manufactured by
defendant, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.2 0 0  Regarding the suffi-
ciency of the evidence presented, the court stated:
[U]ndoubtedly the most useful and conclusive type of evidence in a
case such as this is epidemiological studies. Epidemiology attempts to
define a relationship between a disease and a factor suspected of caus-
ing it-in this case ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy. To de-
fine that relationship, the epidemiologist examines the general
population, comparing the incidence of the disease among those peo-
ple exposed to the factor in question to those not exposed. The epide-
miologist then uses statistical methods and reasoning to allow her to
draw a biological inference between the factor being studied and the
disease etiology. z 1
193. Id. at 428.
194. Id. at 427.
195. Id. at 430.
196. FED. R. EVID. 702.
Testimony by Experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data,
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Id.
197. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989).
198. Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
199. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
200. Brock, 874 F.2d at 308.
201. Id. at 311 (citing A. Lilienfeld & D. Lilienfeld, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 3 (2d
ed. 1989)).
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In Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,202 defendant Merrell Dow ap-
pealed a jury award of compensatory damages to plaintiff Ealy due to
injury resulting from plaintiff's use of defendant's product, Bendec-
tin.20 3 In reversing the lower court, the appellate court reasoned that
the then existing body of published epidemiological studies found "no
significant statistical association between the ingestion of Bendectin
and birth defects., 20 4
On the other hand, in Daubert,°5 the Supreme Court established
the general applicable standard for admission of expert testimony.20 6
In that case, petitioners' parents alleged that the mothers' ingestion of
Bendectin resulted in the children's birth defects. 20 7 The district court
granted summary judgment to respondent based on the ground that
published scientific evidence did not show a statistical link between
the use of Bendectin and birth defects. 208 The appellate court af-
firmed, but the Supreme Court reversed holding that "'general ac-
ceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of
scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 20 9
The outcome of these cases ultimately depended on epidemiological
studies and statistical correlations. It is likely that epidemiological
data will become an increasingly standard part of litigation. When it
comes to racial data, however, the standard is likely to be higher. For
racial data to pass legal muster, it must meet both the strict scrutiny
standard and the expert scientific standard required by Federal Rule
of Evidence 702.210
X. RACIAL CLASSIFICATION IN PUBLIC HEALTH:
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
In 2003, the influential Institute of Medicine released a report on
healthcare disparities in the United States. 211 The writers observed
that "standardized data collection ... is critically important in the ef-
fort to understand and eliminate racial and ethnic disparities in
healthcare. '' 212 The researchers conceded that the "collection of racial
202. Ealy, 897 F.2d 1159.
203. Id. at 1159.
204. Id. at 1164.
205. Daubert, 509 U.S. 579.
206. Id.
207. Id at 579.
208. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
209. Id. at 597.
210. FED. R. EVID. 702.
211. INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARI-
TIES IN HEALTHCARE, supra note 3. See Chapter Seven's discussion on data collection and
monitoring.
212. Id. at 215.
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and ethnic data in health systems poses special challenges," including
what types of data to collect and how often.213 The report recom-
mended that information should be recorded as part of the patient's
record and stratified by race, socioeconomic status and primary lan-
guage, where possible. 214 A decade and a half ago, the CDC's work-
ing group on the use of Race and Ethnicity215 in Public Health
Surveillance recommended, among other things, that:
1) for effective public health surveillance, scientific criteria must be
used to define concepts and measurement procedures for categories
such as race and ethnicity,
2) valid and reliable concepts of race, ethnicity and related notions
such as ancestry or national origin should be explored,
3) social, economic and political forces underlying differences in
health status among racial and ethnic populations should be investi-
gated and reported population studies of health status and,
4) when the information on health status of racial and ethnic popula-
tions is reported, the explanation should address: (a) why the informa-
tion is collected (b) how the information is collected and (c) what the
findings mean.
These would appear to be strong and rational recommendations;
moreover, they are designed to draw attention to the problems associ-
ated with racial surveillance. On the other hand, the recommenda-
tions can be criticized on the grounds that they are weak because most
local health departments that conduct public health surveillance
neither have the staff nor the resources to engage in the intellectual
rigors of refining terminologies as called for by the workgroup. 217 Ad-
ditionally, as previously mentioned, much of the data collected by
these agencies conform to the Revised Minimum Standards for the
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity issued by the
OMB in 1997.18 Since the categories developed by OMB were not
anthropologic or scientifically based designations but categories that
described the socio-cultural construct of our society, it seems like the
recommendation that "scientific criteria must be used to define con-
213. Id. at 216.
214. Id.
215. Rueben C. Warren et al., The Use of Race and Ethnicity in Public Health Surveillance,
109 Pub. Health Reports 4-6 (1994) (discussing racial and ethnic variables used with health
information).
216. Id. at 5.
217. TRUST FOR AMERICA'S HEALTH, NATIONWIDE HEALTH TRACKING: INVESTIGATING
LIFE-SAVING DISCOVERIES 8 (2004), available at http://healthyamericans.org/reports/files/Health
TrackingBackgrounder.pdf.
218. Recommendations from the Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and
Ethnic Standards to the Office of Management and Budget, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,874, 36,943 (July 9,
1997). See also Office of Management and Budget, Guidance on Aggregation and Allocation of
Data on Race for Use in Civil Rights Monitoring and Enforcement (2000), available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/b00-02.html.
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cepts and measurement procedures for categories such as race and
ethnicity" was never taken into consideration by OMB staffers. 21
9
From a judicial perspective, courts have not been helpful in issuing
guidelines and recommendations on the use of racial data in public
health activities. In Madison-Hughes v. Shalala,2 ° for example, plain-
tiffs alleged that health care providers, who were recipients of DHHS
funds discriminated against them. "Plaintiffs challenged the failure of
[the DHHS] to comply with [federal regulations] governing Title VI of
[the Act], 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000d, which provide for [the DHHS] to col-
lect data and information from recipients of federal assistance suffi-
cient to permit effective enforcement of Title VI. '' 22 ' The court held
that no statutory mandate existed requiring the DHHS to collect
data. 222 "Title VI's only substantive provision," explained the court,
"simply prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, color, or
national origin.'221 "The language of the statute [did] not provide for
mandatory collection of such racial data. ' 224 The DHHS's collection
of racial data from recipients under 45 C.F.R., section 80.6(b) 225 was
discretionary and not mandatory. The court reasoned that the DHHS
"has been granted the discretion to balance the factors involved in
selecting the data it needs to carry out this responsibility," because the
DHHS is charged with enforcing Title VI compliance.226 However,
this holding may be problematic. Health is an important area where
collection of data by race is clearly needed. This may entail making
the collection of racial data mandatory in some cases. As discussed
earlier in this paper, diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Diabetes signifi-
cantly impact some racial groups more than others. For public health
to effectively address these diseases, the collection of racial data
should be regulated.
Unlike Madison-Hughes however, in Linton v. Carney,22 7 the court
found that a Tennessee policy limiting the number of nursing home
beds available to Medicaid patients disproportionately affected
blacks.228 Plaintiffs, a group of indigent patients, in their action under
Title VI of the Act, filed suit against defendant, the Tennessee Com-
219. Recommendations from the Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and
Ethnic Standards to the Office of Management and Budget, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,874, 36,943 (July 9,
1997).
220. Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121 (6th Cir. 1996).
221. Id. at 1123.
222. Id. at 1125.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 45 C.F.R. § 80.6(b) (2007).
226. Madison-Hughes, 80 F.3d at 1126.
227. Linton v. Carney, 779 F. Supp. 925 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
228. Id. at 932.
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missioner of Health and Environment.229 Plaintiffs sought to enjoin a
state policy through which only a portion of the beds in Medicaid-
participating nursing homes were certified to be available for Medi-
caid patients.23° The plaintiffs contended that "the policy artificially
limit[ed] the accessibility of nursing home care to indigent Medicaid
patients and foster[ed] discrimination against [them] by nursing
homes." '231 The court held that the policy violated federal Medicaid
statutes and various regulations relating to the nursing home survey
and certification process.2 3 2 The court reasoned that "Tennessee's
limited bed certification policy ... transform[ed] the survey and certi-
fication process into an instrument for denying patients' access to the
medically necessary care to which they [were] entitled. 233 Here, the
court took the position that "statistical evidence of disparate racial
impact of state policies and federally fund[ed] programs can establish
liability under Title vI. ' 2 3 4
The court in Madison-Hughes23 found no violation of Title VI of
the Act stating that the DHHS' collection of racial data was discre-
tionary.236 In Linton, however, the court found a violation of Title VI
of the Act based on statistical evidence of disparate racial impact of
state policies.237 The court reasoned that, because of the higher inci-
dence of poverty in the black population and the concomitant in-
creased dependence on Medicaid, a policy limiting the amount of
nursing home beds available to Medicaid patients will disproportion-
ately affect blacks.238 This holding is more in line with the public
health goal of eliminating health disparities. This court was cognizant
that race sometimes determines access to healthcare; and therefore,
the collection of data would be necessary where failure to do so would
have unjustifiable impact on minorities.239
XI. So, WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD FOR RACE BASED
STATISTICS IN PUBLIC HEALTH?
The use of racial statistics in public health surveillance can be
viewed under two prongs. First, the collection of racial data per se is
229. Id. at 927.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 935-36.
233. Id. at 933.
234. Id. at 935.
235. Madison-Hughes, 80 F.3d at 1126.
236. Id. at 1125.
237. Linton, 779 F. Supp. at 932.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 935.
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not likely to violate the Constitution.24 ° Second, very few governmen-
tal interests have been found by the Supreme Court to be compelling
enough to validate racial classification.241 It is hard to predict whether
the Supreme Court will ever take a case that challenges the use of race
in public health activities. In an oft quoted line in Grutter,242 Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that the Court expects that twenty five
years from now (i.e., twenty five years from 2003), the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest ap-
proved (i.e., creating a critical mass of minority students and providing
a diverse student body).243 By the same token, is it logical to argue
that in 2028 it will no longer be necessary to use racial statistics in
public health surveillance? Commentators evaluated Justice
O'Connor's conjecture and concluded that this is unlikely to come to
pass.2 44 Now that Justice O'Connor has been replaced by Justice Sa-
muel Alito, it is likely that the Court will take a more conservative
and stricter look at the use of racial statistics in public health surveil-
lance. This, of course, will depend on how statistics are used.
Historically, the Supreme Court has allowed the use of race in pub-
lic programs when it is used to redress actions having an unjustifiable
disparate impact on minorities. For instance, in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,245 and Cooper v. Aaron,246 the
Court seemed to support use of race-conscious programs to achieve
public school diversity. In Swann, the Court observed that
[s]chool authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to for-
mulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for
example, that, in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic soci-
ety each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro [sic] to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do
this... an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers
of school authorities; absent a finding of constitutional violation, how-
ever, that would not be within the authority of a federal court .... 247
In the recent Supreme Court case, Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School. District No. 1, Chief Justice John Roberts
referred to the argument in Swann as dicta and wrote that Swann
240. Lilquist and Sullivan, supra note 7, at 443.
241. Id.
242. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
243. Id. at 345.
244. ALAN KRUEGER, JESSE ROTHSTEIN, SARAH TURNER, CTR. FOR STUDIES IN HIGHER
EDUC., RACE, INCOME, AND COLLEGE IN 25 YEARS: EVALUATING JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CON-
JECTURE (2006), available at http://cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/docs/ROP.+Krueger.19.06.pdf
(last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
245. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267 (1971).
246. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).
247. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
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evaluated a school district engaged in court ordered segregation.248
Furthermore, Justice Roberts argued that in Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation249 that the Court found the assignment of students to different
schools on the basis of race, violated equal protection and that pro-
grams that use race in school assignments to achieve diversity cannot
be distinguished from Brown.25 ° The Chief Justice added an interest-
ing thought by stating, "[g]overnment action dividing us by race is in-
herently suspect because such classifications promote 'notions of
racial inferiority and lead to politics of racial hostility."'251 Here, the
Chief Justice argued against distinctions based on race. He observed
that "distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are
founded upon the doctrine of equality. 252
Whether governmental classification by race for public health pur-
poses will lead to notions of racial hostility is hard to tell. Would, for
example, use of racial surveillance advance the notions that the Chief
Justice talked about? Is it possible to entirely eliminate the use of
race from governmental decision making? The answer to these ques-
tions is likely "no" because public health still needs the use of race in
its programs. What should be at issue is not the collection of racial
data per se but what the information is being collected for. Based on
the foregoing discussion, the Supreme Court is likely to take the same
approach in public health cases as in school diversity cases. There-
fore, racial classification, even for public health purposes, is presump-
tively invalid and can be upheld only if there is a compelling justifica-
tion. The premise that racial statistics may not be used in public
health surveillance in the future is becoming increasingly possible.
As noted earlier in the discussion, the California Civil Rights Initia-
tive passed in 1996 amended the state constitution to prohibit public
institutions from discriminating on the basis of race, sex, or ethnic-
ity. 53 In 1998, Washington State voters passed the Washington State
Civil Rights Act which called for the state not to discriminate against
or grant preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of pub-
lic employment, public education, or public contracting.254 Similarly,
in 2006, voters in Michigan passed the Michigan Civil Rights Initiative
248. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2752 n.10
(2007).
249. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
250. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S.Ct. at 2767-68.
251. Id. at 2744.
252. Id. (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 214).
253. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31.
254. See WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (1), supra note 143.
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which amended the state constitution to prohibit affirmative action
programs that gave preferential treatment to persons or groups based
on race, gender, color, ethnicity, or national origin in public education,
employment, and contracting. 5 Although other states have not fol-
lowed this trend, the Supreme Court indicated its approval by refusing
to overturn the California Civil Rights Initiative.25 6 Given the sub-
stantial number of government funded epidemiologic studies that use
racial statistics, these voter initiatives serve as early warning signs of
what may happen if no exemption is provided for race related mea-
sures in public health surveillance.
XII. CONCLUSION
With the current conservative leaning of the Supreme Court, the
Court is not likely to look favorably on the use of racial statistics in
public health activities. This might mean that public health agencies
would have to develop other parameters for collecting health informa-
tion, such as, socioeconomic status, neighborhood and geographic lo-
cations, and disease conditions. Whether the race neutral data
collection system will positively or negatively impact the health of mi-
norities is a matter of conjecture. What is apparent is that the use of
racial statistics in both medical research and public health surveillance
probably will undergo strict scrutiny by the courts. It is of critical im-
portance, therefore, that the public health community includes public
health attorneys and other lawyers in the drafting, formulation, test-
ing, and implementation of data collection instruments. Attorneys are
familiar with the constitutional principles of equal protection and due
process, standards of review, powers and duties of the state, limita-
tions on the power of the state to constrain the autonomy, privacy,
liberty, proprietary, and other legally protected interests of individuals
in order to assure the health of a population and limitations on the
duties of states to assure the health of a population. 7 Furthermore,
it is critical that public health practitioners advance the thesis that un-
like public education, employment, and contracting, public health is
an important area where collection of data by race is needed, espe-
cially in an effort to understand and eliminate racial and health
disparities.
255. See MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26, supra note 143.
256. Coal. for Econ. Equality v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.1997).
257. GOSTIN, supra note 10.
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